MUGHAL RETREAT FROM COASTAL ANDHRA

By J. F. RICHARDS

Purpose

The aim of this article is to describe and assess those political changes occurring in the Godavari region of coastal Andhra (i.e. the districts of Srīkākūlam, Rajamundry, and Elluru) as a result of Mughal conquest in the later 17th century. Previous to that event, the Muslim kingdom of Golconda with its capital at Hyderabad had ruled this predominantly Telugu-speaking region. But imperial occupation did not carry with it increased political and administrative consolidation. On the contrary, extension of the boundaries of the empire brought about a perceptible decline in Muslim state power as exercised from Hyderabad. At the same time Telugu warriors who had served the king of Golconda as troop commanders and local administrative intermediaries became self-sufficient *rājas*.

Golconda's administration on the northern coast

In A.D. 1590 the tributary *rāja* of Kasimkota (located 20 miles east of Vishakapatnam) rebelled against his Muslim suzerain, the Quṭb Shāh king of Golconda. The defiance of Mukandrāj Bahūbulendra, descendant of the great Gajapati kings of Orissa, precipitated a decade-long series of wars between him and the armies of his former suzerain, Muḥammad Qulī Quṭb Shāh. But at the end of this protracted encounter, the rebel, Mukandrāj, had fled to exile in Bengal, his chief commanders were dead, and Muslim armies occupied Kasimkota.[1] The remaining *rājas* in this area had been given a firm demonstration of the military power controlled and deployed from Hyderabad on the Telengana plateau. Thus, by a long-familiar process, the frontier line of Muslim political expansion had moved along the eastern coast of India beyond the Godavari river delta to the border of Orissa. At that border, the newly-arrived Muslim administrators and soldiers of Golconda met their counterparts in the Mughal empire, who had come south to occupy Orissa in the 1590's.

The lands acquired in the trans-Godavari region became the district of Srīkākūlam (Persian: Sīkākūl), named after the principal town of the area. Srīkākūlam was a tongue of land extending north-eastwards along the coast approximately 260 miles from Rajamundry, the headquarters and fortress for the district of the same name immediately north and south of the Godavari river. During the 17th century, difficulty of communications, distance from Hyderabad, and size led the Quṭb Shāhs to treat Srīkākūlam virtually as a sub-kingdom.

Thomas Bowrey, the British merchant who travelled in the Bay of Bengal during the latter part of the 17th century, devoted a portion of his account to the "Coast called Gingelee" by European seamen. The "Gingelee Coast" stretching from the Godarvi to Orissa was virtually identical to Srīkākūlam, the Golconda

province. Bowrey noted the bustling trade of the region, its large textile manufactures, and its overwhelming production of foodstuffs. Triple cropping each year allowed the export of large amounts of grain and dairy products. Bowrey listed the principal ports and then described the political situation:

> [Aside from the ports] There be many other faire towns alonge this Shore . . . Some Fortifications alsoe but all Under the Government of the Moors, Subject to the Golcondah Kinge, Of which [towns] Chicacol [i.e. Srīkākūlam] is the most famous for large and stately buildings, the richest Merchants, the most populated, and Especially for that it is the residence of Sr. Larskare [*sar-lashkār*], the Kings deputy or Viceroy, *Who bears as great Sway Over this Coast in Generall as the Kinge his Master doth in Golcondah*. He liveth in great State and Splendor, and hath continually a great Retinue of Lifeguard men [i.e. the royal bodyguard] and Soldiery, being for the most part Moors and Persians . . . .
>
> Having this Entire Sea Coast Under his Command, and power Soe Great Over the Inhabitants hereof, he can in one day raise a Very Considerable army of at least 100 thousand fightinge men.[2]

In other words, the central administration delegated the responsibility for Srīkākūlam to the *sar-lashkār*, or provincial governor, who was given almost regal powers and authority. Through this governor the Quṭb Shāhs exercised unchallenged authority in the province. At the same time Bowrey leaves no doubt that the *sar-lashkār* was an official of Golconda, not a tributary king.

The passage also suggests that the governor of Srīkākūlam administered his territory as tightly as the Quṭb Shāh controlled the more central portions of the kingdom; but this is open to some question. It is more than likely that in Srīkākūlam the administration was not so regularized as in the provinces closer to the centre. The system of *parganas*, each with its Golconda-appointed tax official, may not have been imposed in Srīkākūlam as systematically as in Telengana or in the Krishna-Godavari *doab* on the coast.[3] Instead, the Muslim governor (i.e. the *sar-lashkār*) dominated the coastal plain with the aid of a compact standing army composed, as Bowrey suggests, of Muslims. Kasimkota and Srīkākūlam were the two major fortified strong points and refuges for the Muslim forces. Rajamundry town on the Godavari supplied reserves when and if they were needed.

The *sar-lashkār* also commanded a body of Telugu warriors, mostly Razus and Valamas, who had come north with the invading armies. These auxiliaries (called *sardārs*) and their followers held lands on the coastal plain on varying kinds of military tenure. The Telugu *sardārs* and their troops helped to enforce Muslim domination on the indigenous regional aristocracy, a group of *rājas* descended from the Gajapati kings of Orissa. On the higher plateau, inland from the coast, the Gajapati *rājas* ruled as tributary chiefs who appear to have been allowed internal autonomy on their holdings. The most prominent and powerful Gajapati *rāja*, Varasima Dev, controlled Jeypur, the leading town on the plateau. Thus, an

important distinction can be made between the more productive narrow coastal plain, and the less fertile refuge areas of the hilly plateau. The former area was subject to direct military occupation by Muslim administrators and troops aided by recently arrived Razu and Valama auxiliary warriors; the latter area was more or less left to the control of the indigenous Gajapati *rājas*.

Below Srīkākūlam lay the lands immediately adjacent to the Godavari River. Rajamundry district included lands to the north and south of the river as well as Nagaur, the large, fertile island in the middle of the Godavari delta. Rajamundry contained about 1,000 villages divided into 24 sub-districts (i.e. *parganas*). South of Rajamundry was Elluru district stretching from the coast inland to the Khammamēṭ hills. Elluru contained approximately 650 villages grouped into twelve *parganas*.[4] Both Rajamundry and Elluru districts, more accessible from Hyderabad and longer conquered than Srīkākūlam, possessed more systematic administrative arrangements in the 17th century. Beneath the resident governor of the two districts (i.e. the *sar-lashkār*) Muslim revenue collectors gathered the revenues from each sub-district. Each *pargana* and each village was taxed at an established figure based on the so-called "perfect assessment" (*jam'-i kāmil*) set in the early years of the century.

Effective operation of the political/administrative system in Rajamundry and Elluru districts required co-operation from Telugu warriors just as it did in Srīkākūlam. Even in these somewhat better organized districts the Muslim state needed intermediaries to assist in revenue collection as well as the maintenance of security. Thus, the role of troop commanders holding lands on military tenure (the *sardārs*) was not as important in Rajamundry and Elluru. Instead, the state relied heavily on the services of leading members of the regional warrior aristocracy – in this case members of the Razu caste – who served in semi-official capacities. Each *pargana* possessed a *deshmukh* who aided the collectors sent from Hyderabad in collecting the stipulated taxes from the villages. In return for this service each *deshmukh* held tax-exempt lands, enjoyed an allowance of up to five per cent on the taxes collected, and obtained state guarantees for his local power and status. Other Telugu chiefs, similarly compensated, served as *munīwārs* whose primary task was to ensure maintenance of order in the larger market towns, overland routes, and ports. A *munīwār's* jurisdiction usually extended over several *parganas* or even, at times, an entire district.

In Rajamundry district a representative *deshmukh* family under Golconda was that of the Vauchevoy Razus of Peddapuram (25 miles north-east of Rajamundry town). Successive heads of this family had acted as *deshmukhs* of a single *pargana* since the original Muslim conquest. The Vauchevoy Razus had first "made themselves useful in disclosing the value, and facilitating the conquest of the country under their superintendence" and thereafter had been reliable collaborators with the Hyderabad state.[5]

Nearly 60 miles due south from Peddapuram was Kānci Kālva (modern

Mogulturru), a fortified town located on the southernmost branch of the Godavari river as it entered the Bay of Bengal. Kānci Kālva was the headquarters of the Koldinder house, another Telugu family, also of the Razu caste. Shortly after the accession of Sultan Muḥammad Qulī Quṭb Shāh, in 1580, Ganga Razu, a chief of Koldinder *pargana* in Kondapalli district (bordering on Elluru district), travelled to Hyderabad city at the command of the new ruler. At a court audience Ganga Razu was commissioned as *deshmukh* of Elluru district. The king charged Ganga Razu as "a native of that Country" with assisting the royal officers in subjugating the Godavari region and with suggesting "a proper mode for the management of those Circars [districts]".[6] The new intermediary for the Hyderabad regime also obtained full tax-free rights over 14 *parganas*, five in Elluru itself, one in Rajamundry district, and the remainder to the south along the coast. One *pargana*, which presumably was especially lucrative, contained the port of Nursapur and its hinterland.

Ganga Razu, successful in his task and apparently well suited to his administrative and political role, retained his position and passed it on to his successors, who were regularly confirmed as *deshmukhs* of Elluru. By the early 1670's an English merchant, travelling through the region, characterized the Koldinder Razus as "an antient familye in great repute in these parts, well esteemed with the Great Governours".[7] By the time of the Mughal conquest in 1687 Rama Razu, a direct descendant of Ganga Razu, was listed by the new administration as *munīwār* of eleven of the twelve *parganas* in Elluru district.[8] He was undoubtedly *deshmukh* of the district as well. Thus, for over a century, the Koldinders had retained power and influence in their hereditary role as collaborators and intermediaries for the Hyderabad-centred Muslim state. As long as the state remained stable and powerful, the ruling élite of Golconda could elicit what appears to have been reasonably willing co-operation from local Telugu families like the Vauchevoys and Koldinders. When the state weakened, or when sudden political changes occurred, the question of co-operation was thrown open once again. A new regime at Hyderabad, such as the administration set up by the Mughals in early 1688, had to negotiate new terms of service with these intermediaries and auxiliaries, whether *deshmukhs*, *munīwārs* or *sardārs*.

Annexation and revolts beyond the Godavari

In 1687 a momentous turning-point occurred in the political history of the Telugu-speaking regions of the eastern Deccan. After a nine-month siege, the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb occupied Golconda fort, deposed the last Quṭb Shāh monarch of the kingdom, and completed the process, begun earlier, of the formal annexation of the kingdom. Temporarily, at least, the Mughal ruler was willing to leave unchanged administrative arrangements and personnel in more remote parts of the kingdom such as the Godavari region. However, the Emperor's

objectives were clearly to establish a formal administrative structure in the new lands uniform with that of other provinces in the empire.

To the north of the Godavari river, as elsewhere in the kingdom, a near breakdown of Quṭb Shāh administration had taken place during the siege of Golconda fort. As early as April 1687, the chief governor of the area, the *sar-lashkār* of Kasimkota and Srīkākūlam, a Brahmin, had lost control "of a great part of the Country" to insurgent *rājas*.[9] A short time later, a new *sar-lashkār*, appointed by Abū 'l-Ḥasan Quṭb Shāh, came from the capital to try and recover the situation. Sayyid 'Abdullāh, the new governor, was a Deccani Muslim who had previously held the office but had lost it several years before because of the rise of the Brahmin party at Golconda.[10] Unaffected by the Mughal victory in September, Sayyid 'Abdullāh continued in office under the administrative control of 'Alī Mardān Khān, Governor of Rajamundry, and later *faujdār* of the Hyderabad Karnatik.[11]

The "wars between the Seer Lascar [*sar-lashkār*] and the Rajahs" continued after Mughal annexation. Virtually all the *rājas* in the region, who were primarily descendants of the Gajapati kings of Orissa, seem to have joined in. By 1689 this resistance was further encouraged by news of revolts further south along the coast in the Karnatik where resistance to the Mughals was encouraged by the Marāthās.[12] Nevertheless, Sayyid 'Abdullāh retained the loyalty of the *sardārs*. Before he died in 1690, the Golconda governor-turned-Mughal-*faujdār* had put down any overt resistance to his authority. He had decisively defeated Varasima Dev of Jeypur and captured many of the *rāja*'s followers, elephants, and other possessions.[13]

For the first three years of Mughal rule the troubles north of the Godavari had been a straightforward case of unsuccessful revolt by the long-established Gajapati *rājas*. Apparently none too serious, this uprising was contained by a Golconda official acting with the support of both his Muslim and Telugu subordinates. But subsequent developments proved more unsettling to the imperial administration.

After the death of Sayyid 'Abdullāh in 1690, the new Mughal administration at Hyderabad sent out a successor to become *faujdār* of Srīkākūlam.[14] Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān, the replacement, although a ranked Mughal *manṣabdār*, was labelled a "Deccani" in official papers, thus suggesting that he had formerly served either Golconda or Bijapur, the other Deccan sultanate in the west. Shortly after Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān's arrival at his new post, the emperor more than doubled the new *faujdār*'s administrative responsibilities by making him *faujdār* of Elluru, Kondapalli, and Kondavidu districts, as well as the two ports of Machilipatnam and Nizapatnam on the Krishna River. The southern districts had been administered by 'Alī Mardān Khān, an officer fallen captive to the Marāthās. In extending so dramatically the scope of Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān's territory, Aurangzeb apparently did not expand the *faujdār*'s military and administrative establishment to match his new responsibilities.

Nevertheless, during the first two years of his administration Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān encountered few difficulties: no further revolts took place and revenue collections revived. But the new *faujdār* was apparently under orders to surpass the revenues obtained by Golconda in the coastal districts in conformity with the sharply enhanced demands set out in the new Mughal revenue settlement of 1689.[15]

Beyond the Godavari, in Kasimkota and Srīkākūlam, which still commanded most of the *faujdār*'s attention, Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān pressed hard for better tax collections. His enthusiasm was so noticeable that he gained a popular reputation for "rapacious avarice". The Mughal officer employed especially harsh measures to extract payments of tribute from the reluctant Gajapati *rājas* of the plateau. In at least one instance, he ordered the execution of a *rāja* and seizure of 20 of the unfortunate chief's villages.[16] Had Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān's severity been confined to the tributary *rājas* he might have continued to extract a stiffened tax-tribute demand from the region. The Quṭb Shāhs had been more than willing to employ forceful measures against dissidents. However, Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān also applied the same measures to his Razu and Valama *sardārs*, settled on the coastal plain, thus disrupting the balanced political and administrative system of the previous regime.

One of the most aggressive *sardārs* in Mughal service was Sitarama Pusapati, a Razu commander, who held a number of villages in Srīkākūlam on condition that he maintain a specified number of cavalry and infantry for service on demand. Sitarama's father, Madava Varma, had migrated north to Srīkākūlam from Kondapalli district in the early 1650's. On arrival in the north Madava Varma was given command of 100 infantry, and two villages. He remained in Golconda service for 33 years and was succeeded as a *sardār* by Sitarama.[17] By the time of the Mughal takeover, Sitarama had far surpassed his father in lands and troops. Nonetheless, although clearly capable and ambitious, Sitarama Pusapati was still only one of a number of *sardārs* who supplied troops on similar terms. For the first few years of Mughal administration, Sitarama remained an obedient auxiliary of the Muslim state. For example, in 1689, during the brief English–Mughal war, acting under the orders of the *faujdār* of Srīkākūlam, Sitarama led his troops in the assault and occupation of the East India Company trading station at Vishakapatnam.[18]

Sitarama Pusapati's alienation from the new regime seems to have begun when Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān expropriated several of the Telugu *sardār*'s assigned villages. In September 1694, when Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān was in the south, busy at Machilipatnam, the Razu chief's resentment at such treatment moved him to sudden rebellion. Sitarama Pusapati, gathering an estimated 4,000 men, plundered all the towns and villages under his control and those nearby. He also killed the Gajapati *rāja* of Putnor and a Razu *sardār*, both of whom had refused to support him. The rebel leader then joined Varasima Dev, of Jeypur, leader of the

earlier revolt in 1687–90.[19] Thus began an incessant series of wars in Srīkākūlam which were to last with few pauses for a decade.

As soon as he heard of the revolt Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān returned to his headquarters at Srīkākūlam. There he began to repair the fort and mount guns, and to enlist new troops. The *faujdār* also sent his chief Brahmin to visit Sitarama at his camp in order to try for a settlement, but Sitarama derisively rejected this overture.

The basic pattern of the conflict soon emerged: the primary object of each party was to win active military support from each of the *rājas* and *sardārs* in the area. The rebels used persuasion and, failing this, threats to frighten reluctant *rājas* into joining them. On his part the *faujdār* issued written orders to all *rājas* in the area to support him. Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān also sent orders to the Koldinder Razus at Kanci Kalva and others in the area around Nursapur, south of the Godavari, to send troops to his assistance. As soon as he could manage to do so, the *faujdār* sent out two detachments each consisting of 100 horse and 2,000 infantry to occupy Sitarama's home territories. These the *faujdār* offered to the Valama *rāja* of Bobbili as an enticement for him to remain loyal. The rebels, deciding not to resist this advance, fell back to more defensible headquarters near Bobbili. From this point they launched an attack on Bobbili fort, which nearly fell before the Mughal forces saved it.

The long-drawn-out business of manoeuvre, negotiation, and raiding continued for months. In December 1694 the *faujdār* was still in unchallenged possession of Srīkākūlam and Kasimkota with an army of 6,000 men and nine artillery pieces. He was expecting several thousand more reinforcements from the *zamīndārs* south of the Godavari, who were on the march. But the rebels could muster an estimated 30,000 troops in their camp. As the stand-off continued peasants, craftsmen, and merchants caught in the middle of the brutal military operations suffered catastrophe as scores of villages were burned. Each week both government and rebel soldiers raided and looted in each other's territory. The rebels were quick to execute those village and town notables who were unco-operative or suspected of assisting the *faujdār*.[20]

As time passed the weakness of Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān's position became more apparent. He was badly outnumbered, deficient in cavalry (the key to Muslim military power), and dependent on support from those *rājas* and *sardārs* who had remained loyal. He received no direct military assistance either from the emperor or from Jan Sipar Khān, the provincial governor of Hyderabad. Many of the *rājas* who supported him were uneasy and feared that the *faujdār* had lost all political influence at the provincial capital and imperial court. A drought and partial failure of crops encouraged a number of smaller chiefs and tax middlemen to support the rebels when they found that they could not make their required revenue payments.

Slowly the military balance began to shift in favour of the rebels. By July

1695, almost a year after the first outbreak took place, the strength of Sitarama Pusapati, Varasima Dev Gajapati, and the other dissident *rājas* had reached the point where they could dictate terms to Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān. The rebels demanded that he leave Srīkākūlam and Kasimkota at once and delegate all administrative authority north of the Godavari to his nephew, who would act as *faujdār* in his uncle's place.[21] In concluding this unfavourable and humiliating agreement Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān left himself politically vulnerable. Jan Sipar Khān, governor of Hyderabad, denounced Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān in an official report to the Emperor. According to the governor, the inhabitants of Srīkākūlam had begged him for relief from Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān's oppression and his disregard for the proper conduct of administration.[22] Jan Sipar Khān suggested that his son, Rustam Dil Khān, be appointed *faujdār* of Srīkākūlam in order to restore the Mughal position north of Godavari.[23] Jan Sipar Khān's attack on the now-vulnerable Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān was the first overt move in an emerging factional conflict which would continue over the next five years. The Hyderabad governor had become increasingly disturbed by the enlarged territory on the coast which came under Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān's jurisdiction in 1690. A year earlier, in 1694, Jan Sipar Khān had begun to put pressure on the *faujdār* to supply records of his administration to Hyderabad, claiming that no records had been sent from the coast over the past five years.[24]

Instead of accepting the governor's suggestion, Aurangzeb ordered each *faujdār* in Hyderabad to send half his military contingent to the aid of Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān.[25] Finally strengthened by reinforcements sent by the governor, Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān reopened the war with the rebels.[26] The *faujdār* returned so aggressively to the conflict that he soon forced the rebels to seek terms. By February 1696 he captured Jeypur town, capital of Varisima Dev Gajapati, the only rebel still fighting.[27] This success put the Mughals once more in possession of the strategic centre of the highland plateau west of Srīkākūlam town.

However, the Mughal *faujdār* was simply not powerful enough to carry out any sort of meaningful consolidation during the temporary halt his capture of Jeypur had brought to the rebellion. In the negotiations which followed between the *faujdār* and the rebels this fact became obvious. Rather than insisting on any form of penalties, Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān could only attempt to buy off their leaders by a series of concessions. He allowed Sitarama Pusapati, the Razu *sardār*, to retain possession of the territories belonging to the dead *rāja* of Putnor, as well as a number of other villages which Sitarama had seized during the course of the rebellion. Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān formally recognized the Razu chief as commander of 125 horsemen and 450 infantry and overlord of territory paying an assessed land tax of more than 80,000 rupees per year. The Vauchevoy Razus of Peddapuram obtained a *sanad* from Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān for *deshmukh* rights to two *parganas* containing 139 villages in the same settlement.[28]

Despite these concessions, the still-disgruntled *sardārs* and the Gajapati *rājas*

began another uprising in the latter part of 1697. Presumably, the emperor had withdrawn the reinforcements from Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān and sent them back to Hyderabad. This time, the rebel coalition was overwhelmingly victorious: the Mughal army virtually destroyed and its commander, Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān, killed.[29]

Aurangzeb immediately sent Rustam Dil Khān, son of the Hyderabad governor, with an army to replace the dead *faujdār*. But Jan Sipar Khān's desire to regain control of the coastal districts through the appointment of his son as *faujdār*, was only briefly fulfilled. The Hyderabad governor did not have the influence at court necessary to make the appointment permanent.[30] Faqīrullāh Khān, the son of Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān, was intent on revenge for his father's death. Within three months, Faqīrullāh Khān had paid his father's arrears to the central treasury, as well as an additional appointment fee to allow him to supplant Rustam Dil Khān.[31]

As soon as he arrived at Srīkākūlam, Faqīrullāh Khān began to push the rebels back. Soon he reached a point where he could inflict bloody punishment. The chronicler of Srīkākūlam reported in May 1699 that, after pursuing Madi Dev Gajapati, the slayer of his father, Faqīrullāh Khān killed Madi Dev and many of the rebels, captured the *rāja's* fortress, and set up Mughal *thānās* or fortified check-points in the captured territory. He sent the head of Madi Dev to the emperor as proof of his success.[32]

Within a year, the continuing factional struggle in Hyderabad caused another damaging shift in the administration of coastal Andhra. Faqīrullāh Khān's position at court deteriorated when he was unable to maintain his full payments to the central treasury (estimated by William Norris at 3.5 million rupees yearly) and ran up arrears amounting to 2.5 million rupees in a single year in office.[33] The emperor approved a follower of Jan Sipar Khān, the governor of Hyderabad, as a replacement for Faqīrullāh Khān. The appointment of Mahdī Khān Bek was also supported by the imperial *wazīr*, Asad Khān, who seems to have been the Hyderabad governor's patron and head of the faction opposed to the Deccanis serving in the province. So inflamed were the emotions of both parties in this conflict that there was very nearly an armed clash between the old and new *faujdārs* at Machilipatnam. For a time, Faqīrullāh Khān had asserted that he would not give up his post because, according to his informants, Mahdī Khān Bek did not have a proper order (*farmān*) from the emperor Aurangzeb. Instead, he could only show an authorization (*parwāna*) from the *wazīr*, Asad Khān.[34] In the end, after a brief skirmish with Mahdī Khān Bek's advance party, Faqīrullāh Khān decided to vacate his office peacefully. He left Machilipatnam and allowed the new *faujdār* to proceed north.[35]

Although he had won the administration of a large and certainly troubled region, the new *faujdār*'s resources scarcely seemed equal to the task before him. Mahdī Khān Bek's escort, in a "poor and mean condition", numbered barely

1,500 horse and foot when it paraded into Machilipatnam. His eight elephants were probably more of an expense than a military asset.[36] The new *faujdār* was also burdened with unprecedented discriminatory orders from Aurangzeb that were certain to be generally unpopular: the *kōtwāls* of the towns all along the coast were to close all drinking shops and expel all prostitutes. Any Hindu found guilty of evading or violating the new edicts would be fined ten rupees. If he could not pay he would be forced to become a Muslim.[37]

Soon after Mahdī Khān Bek reached Srīkākūlam in April 1700, he faced a predictable test of his authority. Nearly all the Razu *sardārs* and the Gajapati *rājas* in the far north refused to obey the new *faujdār* and rebelled.[38] Within a month the situation had deteriorated to the point that the British merchants at Vishakapatnam sent this description to the council at Madras:[39]

> The Revolutions of the Country are much encreased the Nabobs [Mahdī Khān Bek] & Rajahs forces haveing had many Skirmishes in which the latter has allways been victorious and have burnt and plundered almost the whole country and the Nabob now confines himselfe to the Durbar [his audience tent] not caring to adventure himselfe in an open Engagement lest the kings forces [the local troops] should prove treacherous and betray him as they have done many of his predecessors . . . .

Soon afterward the rebels took Kasimkota, the strongest fortified town north of the Godavari. This cut Mahdī Khān Bek off from land contact with the southern coastal districts and might have caused his complete capitulation. But a sudden falling-out among the rebel leaders caused an equally rapid change in the military position. Mahdī Khān Bek, given a reprieve, was able to recover his courage. After the Mughal commander attacked and retook Kasimkota fort, the badly-split rebels were completely demoralized. Finally, in September 1700, the first of the rebel leaders waited on Mahdī Khān Bek in person and submitted.[40] When the Mughal *faujdār* placed ceremonial robes on the shoulders of the various Razu and Gajapati chiefs, this act symbolized another uneasy resolution of the conflict between imperial demands and local autonomy in the far north.

But in just three months' time an egregious error on the part of Mahdī Khān Bek set off another round of battles. The *faujdār* made a clumsy attempt to imprison one of the rebellious chiefs. Mahdī Khān Bek had succeeded in occupying most of the lands held by Timma Razu (of the Vauchevoy *gotram*), whose capital was at Peddapuram, just 25 miles east of Rajamundry town. The Mughal officer promised Timma Razu full restitution of his ancestral territories if he came in person to a formal audience. When the Razu leader appeared in the *durbār*, concealed Mughal troops made him captive. In the brawl which followed this move, over one hundred of Timma Razu's followers were killed, as were a number of the Mughal troops. The remainder of his followers fled (taking their *rāja's* horses, camels, and treasure with them) to Kumili town, headquarters of Ananda Razu Pusapati, son of Sitarama Pusapati. (The latter had died recently

and Ananda Razu had inherited his father's position.) Ananda Razu immediately gathered his troops and summoned all the Telugu warriors in the area for "the greatest Revolutions ever . . . in this Country".[41]

This disastrous episode was followed by 16 months of a familiar back-and-forth struggle between the *faujdār* and the rebels. (Apparently no assistance of any sort came to Mahdī Khān Bek from Hyderabad.) Rustam Dil Khān, the provincial governor, seems to have been fully engaged in avoiding trouble with the Marāthās at the capital during this period. Eventually, the *faujdār*'s position weakened to the point of virtual surrender. He released Timma Razu Vauchevoy and paid an indemnity of 100,000 rupees to the assembled *rājas*.[42] Mahdī Khān Bek's failure gave his rival, Faqīrullāh Khān, another chance to take over as *faujdār* of Srīkākūlam in mid-1702.[43]

The tedious narrative of 15 years of clashes between successive Mughal *faujdārs* and the Telugu warriors of the trans-Godavari region on the Hyderabad coast is more significant than one might think. These recurring revolts were not simply the normal order of politics in a pre-modern Muslim Indian state. Nor were they merely ritual gestures by the Telugu *rājas* against the inevitable encroachment of centralized authority. Beneath the surface details of innumerable battles and skirmishes is a pattern of shifting political relationships in this area.

Under Sayyid 'Abdullāh, between 1687 and 1690, during the first three years after the fall of Golconda fort, the pre-existing political system of the Quṭb Shāhs was still in operation. After the Mughal annexation took effect the problem for Sayyid 'Abdullāh was straightforward: he had to force the volatile Gajapati *rājas* to stop plundering and raiding and pay tribute as they had in the past. He accomplished this objective with the assistance of his Razu and Valama auxiliaries.

In 1690, when Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān became *faujdār*, the situation began to change. The new *faujdār* offended many inhabitants of the area by his demands for increased taxes. He also alienated some of the Telugu *sardārs* by expropriating part of their lands and villages. By 1694, Sitarama Pusapati, most aggressive of the dissident *sardārs*, had rebelled in alliance with the still unhappy Gajapati *rājas*. Some *sardārs* joined the rebels and some stayed loyal to the *faujdār*. On the whole, those who stayed loyal, such as the unfortunate Razu chief of Putnor, or the Valama *sardār* at Bobbili, suffered. Despite assistance sent by the *zamīndārs* from the area south of the Krishna, Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān's position weakened steadily. Factional conflict between *manṣabdārs* in Hyderabad caused a delay in the sending of reinforcements to Srīkākūlam. Fresh Mughal troops only came after intervention by the emperor and after a disastrous defeat suffered by Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān. In 1698, Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān was killed in still another uprising. His two successors could barely regain and keep possession of Kasimkota and Srīkākūlam towns in the face of continued hostility from the *sardārs*.

By 1702, the Mughal presence north of the Godavari was reduced to a holding operation in the coastal plain. The emperor, fully engaged in other areas of the Deccan, spared little attention and few resources for this unimportant corner of the empire. So weak were the Mughals that they gave (or had forced upon them) numerous concessions to the rebellious *sardārs* and *rājas*. The greatest beneficiary of these concessions was the Razu chief, Sitarama Pusapati, who acquired formal recognition by the Mughals of his new and greatly enlarged lands won in the revolts. Sitarama's rejection of his subordinate role in local administration in Srīkākūlam and his successful battles with the Mughal *faujdārs* were the first step in the rise of the Pusapati family. By the end of the 18th century this Razu house with its seat at Vizianagram town controlled the largest *zamīndārī* holding in the British-ruled northern *sardārs*. In the 19th century, the *rāja* of Vizianagram, all rivals swept aside, was one of the wealthiest *zamīndārs* in British India.

Revolt of the deshmukhs in Elluru

Until the end of 1702, the primary focus of resistance to the Mughals had been the truculent *sardārs* and *rājas* of the trans-Godavari region. Indeed, the *deshmukhs* and other Telugu chiefs in Elluru district to the south had obediently sent troops north, across the river, to reinforce the beset *faujdār* of Srīkākūlam. But by 1702, as imperial power and authority encountered increasingly severe challenges all over the Deccan, the area of rebellion widened perceptibly to include the regions south of the river. In these new revolts, the leading figures were Rama Razu and his son Ranga Razu of the Koldinder Razus of Kanci Kalva.

The first encounter between the new Mughal administration and the Koldinder Razus was very much to the disadvantage of the latter. According to one extant family history, the Mughal *faujdār* seized a number of *parganas* which the Quṭb Shāhs had left to the control of the Koldinders. Among the lost *parganas* was the port of Nursapur, which was put under the administration of an imperial officer. Despite these initial encroachments, the Koldinders did retain their long-established intermediary function and offices in Elluru. In 1695 the Hyderabad *dīwān*'s office listed Rama Razu as *deshmukh* of Elluru district. In this capacity Rama Razu was responsible, in conjunction with the chief Mughal *amīn* of the coastal districts, for the collection of annual revenues set at 531,914 rupees for Elluru district.[44]

Moreover, the degree of control exerted from Hyderabad over the *deshmukh* of Elluru was sharply reduced. During the 1690's the power and influence of the Koldinders rose steadily as the lack-lustre Mughal administration on the coast allowed them more and more autonomy in Elluru. For example, Rama Razu, described in the English accounts as "Proprietor & Governor of ye Country of Ellore", succeeded in acquiring the governorship for his son, Ranga Razu, of Madapollam, a very busy port town close to his capital at Kanci Kalva. This post had been held earlier by Mīr Ṣāḥib, a Muslim officer, the son-in-law of Muṣṭafā

Qulī Khān, recently deceased *faujdār* of Sikakul.[45] In theory, Rama Razu was subordinate to Mīr Qā'mā, the chief *amīn* or revenue officer for the *faujdār* of Sikakul, who was stationed at Rajamundry. But as the English merchants at Madapollam pointed out to their superiors at Madras, they had no need to have any dealings with Mīr Qā'mā, who "seldom comes to this place [i.e. Madapollam] but leaves the whole management of the Countrys hereabout to Ranga Raaz in whose power it is to stop our business when he pleases".[46] Perhaps not surprisingly the increased powers of Rama Razu and his son did not result in revenues which were even close to the figure demanded from Elluru in the initial Mughal assessment. During 1697–8 collections were only 24 per cent of the amount assessed, and during 1698–9 only 30 per cent of the assessment.[47]

As the Koldinder Razus gained greater independence and resources, tensions rose between them and various Mughal officials. In 1700, Ranga Razu's followers clashed with troops of the *faujdār* of Nursapur, adjacent to Madapollam. In the battle that followed the local Telugu forces inflicted numerous casualties on the Mughal soldiery. Among the dead was the son of Mīr Muḥammad Hade, the *faujdār*.[48] A few weeks later, Muḥammad Ḥusayn, governor of Machilipatnam, sent 1,000 men to reinforce his threatened colleague.[49] After this the whole affair seems to have died down without further fighting. The incident is an illustration of the kind of powerful state within a state which Rama Razu, his son, and other members of the family were building at Kanci Kalva.

Nevertheless, prior to 1703 the districts to the south had seen nothing comparable to the years of steady revolts which racked the trans-Godavari districts. But suddenly, by the beginning of 1703, Mughal authority below the Godavari was challenged by two separate but simultaneous events: first, Riẓā Khān, a former Mughal officer turned bandit chief, came right to the gates of Machilipatnam with a force of 9,000 to 10,000 men in February. His plundering and burning virtually closed the Machilipatnam–Hyderabad trade route.[50] Simultaneously, the Bedar leader, Padiyah Nayak, executed a long-distance raid in force on the Andhra coast. Marching from his capital at Wakinkira, he captured and held Kondavidu fort in Guntur district for several months. During this period the Bedars regularly sent out parties to ravage the countryside. The raiders met with little or no resistance either from the Mughal *faujdār* or from the local Telugu aristocracy.[51]

The reason that Riẓā Khān and Padiyah Nayak met little or no resistance in Machilipatnam and Kondavidu may have been because Faqīrullāh Khān was fully engaged in a conflict with Koldinder Ranga Razu, *deshmukh* and *munīwār* of Elluru district. In February 1703 the *faujdār* had made a firm demand of Ranga Razu for his arrears of revenue from Elluru district. Ranga Razu immediately took his family and followers north across the Godavari and recruited what troops he could muster with the assistance of several of the Razu chiefs in that area. Faqīrullāh Khān marched north to Madapollam, just south of the river, to

begin operations against the rebels.[52] But Rustam Dil Khān, arriving at Machilipatnam the next month, superseded Faqīrullāh Khān as *faujdār*.

Although the shuffle in Mughal personnel took pressure off Ranga Razu temporarily, there had been no resolution of the conflict. Rustam Dil Khān paused for several weeks at Machilipatnam and then marched north to arrive at Rajamundry, in July.[53] As soon as he reached Rajamundry, he sent for the imperial treasury maintained at Srīkākūlam which contained revenue receipts for the whole trans-Godavari area. Rustam Dil Khān sent the entire contents, 2,000,000 silver rupees, directly to Aurangzeb.[54] This action undoubtedly helped to restore some of the *faujdār*'s lost standing with the emperor, who was badly in need of cash for the siege of Rājgarh fort in Maharashtra.

Next, Rustam Dil Khān summoned all the important chiefs, *rājas*, and *deshmukhs* in the area south of the Godavari to an audience. These dutifully assembled at the *faujdār*'s camp, located on the south bank of the river across from Rajamundry town. Suddenly, in the midst of these audiences, all the Telugu leaders bolted from Rustam Dil Khān's camp, crossed the Godavari, and hauled up all the boats to prevent pursuit.[55] The *faujdār* decided not to force a river crossing and attack the rebels. Instead, he spent over a month in what must have been difficult negotiations with the fugitives. Finally, he reached an agreement with the *rājas* (who had begun to disagree among themselves) for "a reconcilement & accommodation of affairs".[56]

For the next six months, between September 1703 and March 1704, Rustam Dil Khān put every pressure at his command on the coastal area to squeeze out the greatest possible amount of revenue. Virtually every inhabitant of the area – from the greatest *rājas* like Koldinder Ranga Razu and their lesser colleagues right down to the ordinary cultivator – felt the impact of these demands. A number of unfortunate people were so brutally treated by the Mughals that they sold their cattle or even their wives and children to escape punishment. Others caught by the Mughals committed suicide.[57] Throughout this period, Rustam Dil Khān did nothing about Riẓā Khān and the other bandits who cut off the trade routes between the coastal ports and the capital.[58] Mughal officials on the coast also made no attempt to stop the Marāthās when they raided Machilipatnam in February. In fact it was popularly believed that Rustam Dil Khān was tacitly encouraging the Marāthās to raid his territories.[59]

Finally, Rustam Dil Khān led his army across the Godavari north-east to Vishakapatnam. Here he began a lengthy series of discussions and audiences with the resident Mughal officials and the troublesome chiefs of the auxiliary forces, the *sardārs* headed by Ananda Razu Pusapati. For over two weeks a great encampment, estimated at over 40,000 armed men, encircled the *faujdār*'s tents.[60] When these meetings ended, Rustam Dil Khān led the great host north to Srīkākūlam. Here, now supported by the *sardārs*, he captured and killed three of the principal Gajapati *rājas* in an impressive show of force.[61]

On the surface, at least, Rustam Dil Khān's slow progress from Machilipatnam to Srīkākūlam was a complete success. The Mughal governor's negotiations at Rajamundry and Vishakapatnam ended all overt resistance on the part of the Telugu *rājas* and *sardārs*. Rustam Dil Khān's most recent victory over the Gajapati *rājas* "struck such a terror into all people" that the English merchants believed "the Country will be peacably and quietly settled under his Government, . . . ".[62] But these successes were won at a considerable cost. At the same moment that he reaffirmed Mughal paramountcy along the Andhra coast, Rustam Dil Khān capitulated to the newly-asserted power of the Hindu chiefs. The *faujdār*'s brutality and military flourishes disguised what was really a Mughal retreat from direct administration over Srīkākūlam, Rajamundry, and Elluru districts.

The immediate beneficiaries of Rustam Dil Khān's policies were the three most powerful Razu *zamīndārs* in the area: Pusapati Ananda Razu of Vizianagram, Vauchevoy Timma Razu of Peddapuram, and Koldinder Ranga Razu of Kanci Kalva. Each of these men acquired formal Mughal recognition of his domination over large portions of additional territory.[63] One of the most significant concessions made by Rustam Dil Khān was the grant of the "town of Narsapore [Nursapur] and its dependance" to Ranga Razu.[64] This acquisition gave Ranga Razu renewed possession of an important seaport and shipbuilding centre located near Kanci Kalva (Mugalturru), his capital on the Godavari. It had also been the headquarters for Muḥammad Hade, the Mughal *faujdār*, with whom Ranga Razu had clashed three years before. Dispossession of the *faujdār* of Nursapur meant that the Muslim presence in Elluru and Rajamundry, never very impressive, was now weakened even further.

The three *rājas* now had a free hand in the ruling of their territories. As long as they made minimal gestures of obedience to the Mughal officers left in the region and occasionally paid part of their revenue arrears they could prosper undisturbed. Mughal officers rapidly became either ineffectual figureheads or local chiefs competing with their former subordinates. Ranga Razu, for example, quickly acquired a set of previously discouraged attributes of nearly autonomous power. He "established a mint at Mugletore [Kanci Kalva] and erected Nine Forts on different parts of this Country [i.e. Elluru]".[65] The Telugu *rāja* also made substantial investments in the sea trade. Trading ships owned by him began to sail regularly out of Kanci Kalva, Nursapur, Madapollam, and other ports at the mouth of the Godavari.[66]

Linked by blood and marriage ties in an informal alliance, these three dominant Razu chiefs were left free to expand against other less aggressive Valama and Gajapati *rājas*.[67] They also seized every opportunity to acquire parts of the *hawīlī* lands which formerly had supported the Muslim garrisons at Rajamundry, Srīkākūlam, and Kasimkota towns. Territorial expansion also proceeded against the Dutch, who unlike the British had not fortified their settlements in the north, and who no longer were protected by the Mughal government. Thus, in 1707

Ananda Razu, the Pusapati chief, occupied Bimlipatam and drove off the Dutch merchants.[68]

At that time (just after news of Aurangzeb's death reached the area) the English at Vishkapatnam viewed Ananda Razu as "the most pow[erful] Rajah in these Parts" who "Lords it from [one] place to another".[69] The Dutch saw Koldinder Ranga Razu and Vauchevoy Timma Razu as the most important *rājas* to the south in the districts of Elluru and Rajamundry.[70]

Once begun, the momentum of expansion continued steadily. 70 years later, this trio of Razu families personally ruled well over half the lands above and below the Godavari river. When in the mid-1770's the British began to assess their new possessions (the "Northern Circars") they found that real power in Srīkākūlam, Rajamundry, and Elluru was in the grasp of these Razu *zamīndārs*, not their Muslim superiors sent out from Hyderabad. At the time of James Grant's survey, the Koldinder Razus of Mugalturru counted well over 200 villages in six *parganas* of Elluru district under their jurisdiction, the Vauchevoy Razus of Peddapuram held 585 villages or half of Rajamundry district, and the Pusapati Razus of Vizianagram controlled at least three-quarters of the villages and revenues of the trans-Godavari region.[71]

Conclusion

In the immediate aftermath of Mughal annexation, the Telugu *sardārs* and *deshmukhs* of Elluru, Rajamundry, and Srīkākūlam districts felt a sudden increase in state pressure. Enhanced tax demands and expropriated villages and *parganas* aroused dissatisfaction and resentment among this important group. But within a short time, equally sudden imperial weakness allowed successful rebellions. As a result, the auxiliaries of Muslim power rapidly seized that power. Men whose fathers had migrated north in the early 17th century and become *sardārs* holding lands on military tenure (like the Pusapatis) or who had acted as *deshmukhs* (like the Vauchevoys and Koldinders) were now *rājas*. They lacked only the legitimation afforded by an independent political tradition to become nearly autonomous kings.

Territorial aggrandizement was a major element in this change. These newly emergent Razu leaders grew both at the expense of other local chiefs and at the expense of the state. Yet we can also see a growing mercantilism. By the early years of the 18th century, economic links which in the past had stretched back to Hyderabad city, the greatest market in the eastern Deccan, now focused on the rising capitals of these proto-kings. For a brief time, until the power of the state was once again established at Hyderabad, smaller, multiple foci for power and trade had emerged. 20 years of imperial rule diminished rather than intensified Muslim power on the eastern coast.

List of abbreviations

Akh.:	Sitamau Collection, "Akhbarati-i-Darbar-i-Mualla" Raghubir Library, Sitamau (M.P.), India. Collection of copies of brief but informative reports of events sent to the Mughal emperor.
I. J. Coll.:	National Archives of India, New Delhi, Inayat Jang Collection. Collection of Mughal official documents from the six provinces of the Deccan. Cited by serial number of the National Archives.
K.A.:	Koloniaal Archief of the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, "Inkomend Briefboek". Correspondence and reports from Dutch merchants stationed on the coast. Cited by the abbreviation followed by the volume number, date, and folio number.
RFSG: Diary:	*Records of Fort St. George: Diary and consultation books*. 1672/78–1756. 85 vols., Madras: Records Office, 1910–43.
RFSG: Letters to FSG:	*Records of Fort St. George: Letters to Fort St. George*. 1681–1765. 45 vols., Madras: Records Office, 1910–43.

NOTES

[1] H. K. Sherwani, *Muhammad Qulī-Qutb Shah*, New York, 1968, 108–15.

[2] Thomas Bowrey, *A geographical account of countries round the Bay of Bengal: 1669–1679*, ed. Richard Temple, (The Hakluyt Society Series 2, Vol. 12), Cambridge, 1905, 124–5. Emphasis supplied.

[3] This is an inference based on incomplete listings of *parganas* for Srīkākūlam in Mughal records made just after the conquest.

[4] Figures for the numbers of villages come from an early-18th-century Mughal revenue manual, the "Deh-be-dehi Suba Farkhonda Bonyad", State Archives of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, India.

[5] James Grant, "Political survey of the northern circars", in *Fifth Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company*, Sessional Papers, House of Commons, 1812, Vol. VII, 666.

[6] From the Machilipatnam district record office, Andhra Pradesh, India, "To Edward Saunders Esq. President and Members of the Committee of Circuit the humble Representative of Raja Culdindy Tripetty Rauze Bahauder Desmookee of Ellore Circar and Zemindar of Mugletore", dated 11 June 1786, Mas. Dist. Rec. 3086, 614–5. I am indebted to my colleague Joseph Brennig for this reference. The document is part of the materials accumulated for James Grant's survey of the coastal districts cited above.

[7] Streynsham Master, *The diaries of Streynsham Master*, ed. Richard Temple, London, 2 vols., 1911, II, 162.

[8] I. J. Coll., I/1/9 to I/1/34, contains the first Mughal listing of *deshmukhs* and *munīwārs* for Hyderabad.

[9] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 17 April 1687, 116.

[10] ibid.

[11] "Akhām-i Alamgīrī". State Archives of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, India, Persian MS 1358, f. 52a.

[12] India Office Library, London, "Original Correspondence", Fort St. George to London, 1 February 1689, No. 5698, 30.

[13] "Akhām-i Alamgīrī", f. 52a.

[14] For the appointment of Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān see *RFSG*: *Diary*, 1 April 1692, 11.

[15] For a full description of this point see ch. v in my forthcoming book, *Mansabdārs and nāyaks*: *Imperial administration in the eastern Deccan, 1687–1724* (Clarendon Press).

[16] India office Library, London, *Factory Records*, Vizagapatam, "Consultations" G/39/1, 4 September and 30 October 1694. The Dutch merchants also commented on Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān's brutality. See K.A. 1408 (25.4.1692) f. 698.

[17] India Office Library, London, "Kyfyat of Vizianagarum Zamindary", Elliot Collection: Eur. MS F. 46, 256–7. Madava Varma's lands yielded an assessed tax of 5,207 rupees. Approximately half went to support him and his troops and the remainder went to the state.

[18] *RFSG*: *Diary*, 15 October 1689, 86. Ibid., 7 December 1689, 95–6.

[19] Vizagapatam "Consultations", 26–7 August 1694. Simon Holcome, head of the British trading station at Vishakapatnam, provides a near daily account for the first eight months of the rebellion. Unless otherwise cited, the following narrative relies on this source.

[20] On 27 October 1694, Holcome received reports that "last night Razuma [modern Razum, located just north of Srīkākūlam] a great Town & 3 or 4 adjacent villages were robb'd & burnt & some of ye chiefs of ye inhabitants of Razuma were beheaded". Vizagapatam "Consultations".

[21] Madras Presidency, *Records of Fort St. George*: *Public despatches to England*, I, Madras, 1915, 23 June 1695, 20.

[22] Akh., 39 (6 Zelhejja), 45. Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān defended his record in the same newsletter.

[23] ibid.

[24] Vizagapatam, *Consultations*, 21 October 1694.

[25] Akh., 39 (6 Zelhejja), 45.

[26] Akh., 39 (9 Rabi II), 112. Records the sending of assistance by Jan Sipar Khān to Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān.

[27] *RFSG*: *Despatches*, 10 February 1696, 48.

[28] "Kyfyat of Vizianagarum Zamindary", 156–7; Grant, op. cit., 666.

[29] *RFSG*: *Diary*, 25 October 1697; I. J. Coll., I/13/669.

[30] *RFSG*: *Diary*, 31 January 1698.

[31] H. H. Das, *The Norris embassy to Aurangzib*, Calcutta, 1959, 145; *RFSG*: *Diary*, 29 April 1698, 48.

[32] Akh., 43 (19 Zelhejja), 111.

[33] Das, op. cit., 146. Norris put the annual payment required from Faqīrullāh Khān at £400,000 English money. This, if converted at 2s. 3d. (the rate supplied by Norris), equals 3,520,000 rupees. See p. 127 for his discussion of the currency. By this date nearly all the coastal districts were classified as *khāliṣa* for revenue purposes.

[34] Das, op. cit., 146; *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 30 June 1700; 9 September 1700. The British merchants describe Mahdī Khān Bek as "nearly related" to Jan Sipar Khān, which could mean kinship as well as a close personal relationship.

[35] *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 30 January 1700, 19; 7 February 1700, 25.

[36] Das, op. cit., 152.

[37] Das, op. cit., 149.

[38] *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 28 April 1700, 50.

[39] *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 17 May 1700, 63.

[40] *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 4 September 1700, 90.

[41] *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 10 December 1700, 135.

[42] *RFSG*: *Diary*, 7 March 1702, 26; ibid., 6 April 1702, 32.

[43] *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 22 February 1703, 23.

[44] I. J. Coll., I/12/338; I/16/632.

[45] On 30 March 1699 the British merchants at Madapollam bought a compound and

storehouse and a house with another compound for 680 gold *pagodas* from "Rangarays Gov. of Madapollam son of Colindee Ramarays Proprietor & Governor of ye Country of Ellore". India Office Library, London, *Factory Records*, Masulipatam, "Proceedings of the Old Company", 1699–1700, G/16/13, p. 41. Six years before, the British merchants at Vishakapatam had noted in their journal that "Meer Saibe", the governor of Madapollam, was the son-in-law of Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān. Vizagapatam, "Consultations", 28 July 1693.

[46] *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 5 September 1700, 84–5.

[47] I. J. Coll., I/19/452. The total assessment was raised slightly to 553,250 rupees in 1698, up from 531,914 rupees.

[48] *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 5 September 1700, 84.

[49] ibid., 29 October 1700, 94.

[50] K. A. 1570, (10.10.1703), Second Part, f. 28.

[51] Akh., 47 (18 Shawal), 205b; (28 Zelqadda), 78–9a; (1 Zelhejja), 80b. See Jadunath Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib* (Calcutta, 5 vols., 1912–30), IV, 387–9, V, 214–34, for an account of the Bedars.

[52] *RSFG*: *Letters to FSG*, 22 February 1703, 23. The Koldinder statement of 1786 comments that the Mughal officers at this time were "so oppressive that all the Zemindars rose against them, and drove them out of the Country", Mas. Dist. Rec. 3086, 616.

[53] ibid., 3 July 1703, 94.

[54] ibid.

[55] ibid., 5 August 1703, 101; 13 August 1703, 106.

[56] ibid., 22 September 1703, 106; 10 December 1703, 140. K.A. 1570, (7.10.1703), f. 280.

[57] K.A. 1584, (2.2.1704), f. 116.

[58] ibid.

[59] William Tillard, the British factor at Machilipatnam, wrote that "tis believed that the severall ffusdars under Rustamdell consent to their [the Marāthās] Pillageing the Country . . .". *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 13 March 1704, 12–13.

[60] ibid., 31 March 1704, 18.

[61] ibid., 17 April 1704, 37.

[62] ibid.

[63] Ananda Razu obtained Sambham and Toleru *parganas* carved out of the large *hawīlī pargana* surrounding Srīkākūlam town, as well as three additional villages and a small piece of territory near Kasimkota. ("Kyfyat of Vizianagarum Zamindary", 259; Grant, op. cit., 670.) Timma Razu took over 71 villages forming a *pargana* located on Nagaur, the great deltaic island in the Godavari. (Grant, op. cit., 666.) Ranga Razu "by his good management and fidelity to government, was rewarded with the zemindarry rights" over nearly 200 villages. (Grant, op. cit., 662.) James Grant secured his information from the heirs of these men in the 1770's.

[64] *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 4 April 1704, 18. Rustam Dil Khān seems to have made this grant in the course of his deliberations at Vishakapatnam.

[65] Mas. Dist. Rec. 3086, 616.

[66] ibid.; also *RFSG*: *Diary*, 19 August 1714, 109–10.

[67] Grant mentions that the Vauchevoy Razus of Peddapuram were kin to the Pusapatis of Vizianagram. (Grant, op. cit., 665.) A British report of 1714 states that Ananda Razu had married the daughter of Koldinder Ranga Razu. (*RFSG*: *Diary*, 19 August 1714, 110.)

[68] K.A. 1637, (31.3.1707), fs. 36–7. The "Kyfyat of Vizianagarum Zamindary" (p. 259) states that Ananda Razu obtained Bimlipatam *pargana* from Rustam Dil Khān's successor at a *peshkash* of 9,450 rupees.

[69] *RFSG*: *Letters to FSG*, 14 June 1707, 2. Inserted words are from the editor of the text.

[70] K.A. 1653, (11.8.1708), f. 498. Of the "*diverse groote land pagters*" these two were the foremost.

[71] Grant, op. cit., 662, 665–6, 669–70.